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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
§78-2a-3(2)(e), Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE I. DID THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE EXHIBIT BIAS 
TOWARDS CHRISTENSEN IN FRONT OF THE JURY? 
Standard of review: Determining whether a trial judge committed error by failing to 
recuse himself is a question of law and should be reviewed for correctness. State v. Tueller, 
2001 UT App 317If 7, 37 P.3d 1180, 1183 (Utah App. 2001). 
Because Christensen failed to properly preserve this issue before the trial court, he 
must now show either "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances" before this issue can be 
reviewed by the Court of Appeals. To establish plain error, Christensen must show that: 
(1) The error occurred; 
(2) The error should have been obvious to the trial court; 
(3) That absent the error there is reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for Christensen. State v. Tueller, 2001 UT App 317 f 9, 37 P.3d 
1180, 1184 (Utah App. 2001). 
ISSUE II. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR BY 
REFUSING TO RECUSE ITSELF? 
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Standard of review: Because Christensen did not object at trial or otherwise preserve 
the issue of trial court bias, he must now demonstrate plain error on appeal. State v. Nichols, 
2003 UT App 287 f 25, 76 P.3d 1173, 1178 (Utah App. 2003). 
ISSUE III. DID CHRISTENSEN RECEIVE COMPITENT LEGAL 
REPRESENTATION AT TRAIL? 
Standard of review: Utah has adopted the two prong Strickland test for analyzing 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25 f 6; 496 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 10(Utah2004);Stricklandv. Washington,466U.S.668,104S.Ct.2052(1984). Under 
the Strickland test, the appellant must first demonstrate that his legal counsel's representation 
fell below an object standard of reasonableness. The appellant must then show that, but for 
his counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
trial would have been different. To prevail, the appellant must meet both prongs of the 
Stickland test. Fernandes v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870 (Utah 1993). 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is raised for the first time on appeal is 
a question of law. State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
RULE 614. CALLING AND INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES BY COURT 
(a) Calling by Court. The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a 
party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses 
thus called. 
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(b) Interrogation by Court The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called 
by itself or by a party. 
(c) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to 
interrogation by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity 
when the jury is not present. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
West Valley City accepts Christensen's Statement of the Case, with the addition of the 
following facts to the Statement of the Facts, as set forth below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(1) After Christensen exited his car at the traffic stop, Officer Gill testified that he 
could smell the odor of alcohol coming from Christensen's person. (Transcript 
p. 55).l 
(2) Prior to administering field sobriety tests, Officer Gill specifically asked 
Christensen if he had any injuries or impairments that would stop him from 
performing the tests. Christensen replied that he had a bad leg, but did not 
mention his diabetes or low sugar level. (Transcript p. 61-62). 
(3) Officer Evans testified that he did not find any food in the "driving portion" of 
Christensen's vehicle. (Transcript p. 137). 
1. All citations to the transcript in this brief refer to the "corrected trial transcript" found 
at Page 174 of the Record. 
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(4) Officer Gill testified that he did not attend any hearing at the Department of 
Motor Vehicles regarding the return or suspension of Christensen's license for 
refusing to take the intoxilyser test. (Transcript p. 120). 
(5) Christensen testified that the Department of Motor Vehicles did not hold a 
hearing regarding the return or suspension of his license for refusing to take 
the intoxilyser test. (Transcript p. 214). 
(6) On page 18 of Appellant's Brief, second full paragraph, Christensen 
mischaracterizes the evidence. Christensen's brief states that "The court 
informed Christensen and the jurors that diabetes normally means high blood 
sugar and then asked Christensen...." This phrasing makes it appear as if the 
judge is telling the jury his opinion, rather than asking one of the questions 
submitted by the jury. This statement appears in the middle of the juror 
questions and there is no indication from the record that this was not one of the 
questions submitted by a juror. (Transcript p. 216). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EXHIBIT PREJUDICE OR BIAS 
TOWARDS CHRISTENSEN WHEN IT ALLOWED THE 
JURORS TO SUBMIT QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED OF 
CHRISTENSEN. 
The entire basis for Christensen's appeal is based on the false assumption that the trial 
court judge improperly questioned Christensen in front of the jury, thereby showing bias. A 
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careful reading of the transcript reveals that the judge was merely reading questions that had 
been submitted by the jury in accordance with Utah law. The trial court was consistent 
throughout the trial and allowed similar questioning of prosecution witnesses. The 
questioning was proper and is not evidence of bias by the trial court. 
Even if the questions had been asked by the trial court, there is still no evidence of 
bias against Christensen. The questions were directly related to the evidence and only served 
to allow Christensen to clarify or explain questions about his defense. Furthermore, such 
interrogation by the trial court is specifically allowed by Rule 614 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN 
ERROR IN THIS CASE. 
Christensen failed to object at trial to the conduct that he now complains about. 
Therefore, he must show that a plain error was committed by the trial court in order to raise 
the issue of bias on appeal. Christensen's entire appeal is based on the argument that the trial 
court was improperly asking questions of the jury. Since that argument is factually incorrect 
because the judge was properly reading questions submitted by the jury, there was no error in 
this case. Since there is no error there can be no "plain error," which is a blatant and 
obvious error that the court should have recognized. Also, Christensen must show that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different if his alleged "error" had not occurred. 
Therefore, he is unable to satisfy the "prejudice" portion of the plain error test. The evidence 
5 
against Christensen was overwhelming and even if the trial court committed an error, the 
error would be harmless. 
III. CHRISTENSEN RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF A 
COMPETENT DEFENSE WHICH RESULTED IN A FAIR AND 
JUST TRIAL. 
In order to prevail on his argument of ineffective assistance of counsel Christensen 
must demonstrate that his trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that, but for his counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. He fails to meet either 
standard. 
The only alleged substandard conduct that Christensen points to is his counsel's 
failure to object to the jury questions presented by the judge. Since such questioning is 
allowed by law and the questions were not improper, no competent attorney would have 
objected in that situation. 
Christensen can also not meet the second part of the test. The evidence against 
Christensen was virtually overwhelming and his counsel's objection to the few juror 
questions that were posed by the court would not have changed the outcome of the trial. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EXHIBIT PREJUDICE OR BIAS 
TOWARDS CHRISTENSEN WHEN IT ALLOWED THE 
JURORS TO SUBMIT QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED OF 
CHRISTENSEN. 
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The trial court judge in this case exhibited absolutely no bias or prejudice towards 
Christensen. Christensen's argument to the contrary is like a house of cards. When the 
foundation cards are removed, all of his arguments will fail. 
The foundation for Christensen's appeal is his assertion that the trial court judge 
improperly questioned Christensen while the jury was present. Christensen believes that the 
questioning exhibited bias on the part of the judge which then improperly influenced the jury, 
resulting in Christensen's conviction. While under some circumstances that scenario may 
provide grounds for a proper appeal, in this case it simply isn't true. 
Christensen has his facts wrong. A thorough review of the transcript makes it 
apparent that the trial court judge asked no questions of his own while the jury was present. 
What actually occurred was that at the end of the examination of Mr. Christensen, the judge 
allowed the jurors to submit any questions they may have. It was these juror questions which 
the court then read that Christensen now points to as evidence of bias. The argument is based 
on a false premise. 
The entire exchange between the trial court judge and Christensen is as follows: 
THE COURT: Any further questions? 
MR. ROBINSON: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Does any member of the jury have a question 
(inaudible)? 
[INAUDIBLE.] 
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THE COURT: All right. Mr. Christensen, the first question: Why did you 
refuse to test, that's referring to the breathalyzer test, if you were not intoxicated? 
THE WITNESS: Well, at that point I just couldn't understand why my requests 
were completely ignored and I would keep being asked to take the tests that I didn't think 
were necessary. 
THE COURT: Do you know what your current blood sugar level is? 
THE WITNESS: Right now? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
THE WITNESS: No, but I know it's usually low. 
THE COURT: What is considered a normal blood sugar level? 
THE WITNESS: On my little ultra tester that I use about 150 to - well, 100 to 150. 
THE COURT: Do you know what precipitated your low blood sugar level? Or 
low blood sugar, I'm sorry. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. My doctor told me to lose some weight so I starved myself 
all day. 
THE COURT: Usually diabetes means high blood sugar. Eating sweets would 
increase your blood sugar level. Is that your understanding? 
THE WITNES S: If you have low blood sugar eating sweets will raise it to a normal 
level. 
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r H r CX) 1J R1: ..,; >.- • u wnte the question one more time to make sure I ask the 
right question? i V \ = / • • - . :\ , i^;.;> a^  to your condition? 
THE WITNESS: Well, I know why — » • • * - V:v •, >^v. because it 
was her temple day and she had three or four other riders and it was her turn *o . -:> \ ' -j y 
7 - i ' d a \ . i " , ; >-.- J. A>I \+::i.-<k. 
THF POf. f|ri'' . . : . :. ;• -. ih ;*om counsel based on questions of (inaudible)? 
MR.ALLRED: I have r -
THE COURT: Any other questions of the jur ,} Aii ri •.-•* ^ ^ ^ —n-
may step down (inaudible). (Transcript p. 215-217). 
As (lie tnuiscripl abo\ e demonstrates, the trial court judge is clearly asking questions 
that have been submitted by the jury In Ihd :it one pmnt, iln: euuit states k,'\\ ill you write the 
question one more time to make sure I ask the right question'" ' • u -, •- -
Christensen characterizes the above exchange as the judge acting as a prosecutor. 
(Appellant's Brief pp \f> lb\ i J mvever that is obviously not the case. Thejudge is simply 
passing along questions asked b> llie mmr; lo help thtnL IYMICO Ihat had been raised by 
previous testimony. There Is no ease law or coherent argument that such action Iv* the li ml 
ei )iirl is a demonstration of bias. To the contrary, Utah law allows thejudge the discretion to 
permii - ' * . ^ :. ; / menses, State " ituierwn* 108 Viah 130 '58?.2d 
:2~, 128
 vUtah 1945); State*. Mur--. -- "<•:!* ••,*'- y • ;. 1 - ' \ . n ...... v 
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foundation of Christensen's house of cards defense is based on a false premise. The wrong 
assumption that it was the trial court judge making up the questions, not the jurors. 
The trial court's actions were consistent throughout the trial. At the end of Officer 
Gill's testimony, the judge asked the jury if they had any questions of Officer Gill. 
(Transcript, p. 121). The judge made two similar requests at the end of Officer Evans cross 
examination testimony and after the re-direct testimony following the judges reading of the 
juror's questions. (Transcript, p. 147, 151). In response to the judge's offer, several 
questions were posed by the jury to Officer Evans. These questions were read by the judge in 
the same manner that he read the juror questions to Christensen. (Transcript, p, 147-148). 
Treating both sides in the same manner hardly seems to be evidence of bias on the part of the 
trial court. 
It should also be noted, that the questions asked by the jury are not improper. The 
questions are all logical extensions of previous testimony and are being used by the jurors to 
clarify certain issues in their minds. A good example is the question about Christensen's 
refusal to take the intoxilyzer test. Because of Christensen's evasiveness on cross 
examination, that topic had been the subject of previous confusing testimony. (Transcript p. 
202-206, 210-214). The question by the juror was simply to clarify what had been a 
confusing and often interrupted portion of the testimony. The next several questions related 
to blood sugar levels and the effect of eating sweets on blood sugar levels. These questions 
relate directly to Christensen's defense of diabetes and to his previous testimony. 
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'"lirv'.e* viM\ - '"» :,"v. -.^ • t s^:4oicnd to alleviate the situation more than aggravate 
;;.
 viraiiscri;° r | i ' v . \ \^ \ : - - : ' •- • • ;*.. „ .s 4. :; UJCI: :r,a:^ aoia., ;ne 
effects of diabetes and Christensen's alleged low blood sugar !• ' r - > 1] • ** - .- •>.- -:i r«n 
regarding wn; Christensen's wife did not testify is also perfectly understandable. 
Christensen1 s leslimony was very much in doubt. He had been evasive during cross 
examination and had been Pn : • - ,ulmil I hat •• • •.- lesumony had been mistaken 
or an outright lie. (Transcript p. 195). Certainly thu • L:^  • • ,;.' nkr u 11\ his \\ i te ua >. tn>t 
present to corroborate his story. Christensen was not prejudiced at all by the questions of the 
jury. They were all questions that could have been asked *T. either dire,/ •:- cross 
examination and provided Christenr^n \\\\\\ an additional opportunity to correct and 
misconceptions and clarify his position. 
There were several times when the jury was excused that the trial judge directly 
, i a-- • • •, u
 t •.-;; v . iristensen, and at least one instance where the judge asked questions in front of 
thejurv c'vv-u^i ' ^;> :;.- , . . . . ii.c:>e instances. (Transcript p. 1^0). 
That questioning was also allowable under Utah law "^iK h ' 4(1* ul" 'he I 'lain Male |,|«t 
Evidence specifically allows 'he cav.* *o ; iterrogate witnesses. This rule allows such 
intern gatiun -; »e court even :. ;;ic \ur .s present. The I Jtah Court of Appeals has stated 
that "It is with- -»^  -•.!*:•/ ^er J.J I --K . ..itever questions of witnesses as in his 
judgment is necessary or desirable to clan f--. em la* i * : ^ U I * he c i-w • k r, it relates li i" lie: 
disputed issues/ [citation omitted]" Sia/e ••. :?CM" ;^/. 3:4 ?.2d 550, 553 (Clah App. 1993). 
11 
In this case, the trial court judge should be given credit for proceeding with the juror 
questions in a careful and appropriate fashion. The court acted in accordance with the advice 
of Justice Worthen in his concurring opinion in Martinez. Justice Worthen stated: 
In my opinion no juror should ever be allowed to ask questions of the 
witnesses. If a juror indicates that he has a question the court should invite the 
juror to disclose to the court the question and the court, if the question 
suggested is not germane to the issues involved or is such as would be clearly 
improper and therefore prejudicial to the rights of the defendants to a fair and 
impartial trial should not permit the question to be propounded. If the 
question is germane to the issues, and would not be prejudicial to the rights of 
the defendants to a fair and impartial trial, the judge in turn should ask the 
question himself. 
Martinez, at page 104 (Worthen concurring opinion) (italics in original). 
The trial court was not asking questions of Christensen as he asserts in his brief, but 
rather, was following established Utah law in asking questions propounded by jurors. 
Therefore no bias, not even the appearance of bias, can be shown on the part of the trial 
court. The first card in the foundation of Christensen's argument comes tumbling down. 
Christensen also cannot satisfy the second part of the bias test and prove that he was 
prejudiced. Even if the trial court did error, any such error was harmless. The evidence of 
Christensen's guilt in this case is virtually overwhelming. For example the following 
evidence had been presented: 
(1) Officer Gill of the West Valley City Police Department testifies that 
Christensen fails to stop, despite officer Gill's overhead lights and siren, for a 
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"•• V i ^' • - • M.K - •• 'J\,::;IIL. it approximately twice the normal 
speed limit (Transcript r\ ••!-~ A•"\ 
(2) Christensen was unable to follow simple directions to exit his vehicle. 
(Transcriptp. S?-55. ??0.n i> 
(3) Office ' . • \n JS ". :.:»> .;otn U\>,-iy that they detected the odor of 
alcohol on C h i ^ i e , * - v< : V •• "^ am sintiJ jleoho! domjfc hn as 
sex en fee: away. (Transcript p. 55, 2 i 7, 218). 
(4) Officer Gill and Officer Evans testify that an empty bottle of whiskey and shot 
glasses, are found in C'hnstensen's truck. . i ranscript p. 5n. 135-1 ^7) 
(5) Offu^* ,:* \r- * \:;:i - "• *•**" \ :••. ^ . c:v^ . • .. p -ice station 
Christensen urinates in his pants. (Transcript o. ! 3^ ' : 
(6) Officer Gill testifies that Christensen is unable to perforin ihe Held sobriety 
tesb Hut Officer Gill explains to /an \. ranscript p. 68-72). 
( 7 ) C ~ ii- .'• ^"* ~' ^ •:• '5 * **s f . c^ • i*., . ^ . . : ranscript p. 60). 
(8) Christensen refuses to take an intoxilizer test which woniri '-,:v. «• P ^ • *:••-
actual blood alcohol level. (Transcript p. 76-~9). 
'^; .-.• s; c : -s; i i • -N .:. v -., ; ^ ; cnse witness und L!"IC v oracity of his entire testimony 
is in question because he * •><*..'**.:'* r..; P* * . •< *. • .:; l
 lu
,
. .
,;i:; ^;:iu ;ii 
consumed alcohol (Transcript p. 195; and his testimony )n cross ex animation 
is extremely vague and evasive. (Transcripi p. '109; 
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Based on the evidence that had been presented at trial, there is little doubt that 
Christensen is guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol. There is also little 
doubt that the jury would have found him guilty of that crime regardless of the juror 
questions that were asked by the trial court judge at the conclusion of Christensen's 
testimony. 
Also, the questions that were asked by the jury were entirely appropriate and did not 
damage Christensen in any way. As was described above, the questions related directly to 
the evidence and provided Christensen with an additional opportunity to clarify or explain his 
actions and testimony. The second card in the foundation fails and the entire house of cards 
that is Christensen5 s argument falls. His claims of judicial bias are completely without merit 
and the jury's verdict of this case should be upheld. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN 
ERROR IN THIS CASE. 
Christensen failed to preserve the issue of judicial bias for review by this court. 
Therefore, he must establish that a plain error occurred before the issue can even be raised on 
appeal. In order to prove plain error, Christensen must demonstrate that all three parts of the 
plain error test have been satisfied. First, he must show that an error occurred; second, he 
must show that the error should have been obvious to the trial court; third, he must show that 
error had not occurred and there is a reasonable likelihood that Christensen would have been 
14 
foi ind i lot guilty., I ueller at j|9; State v Dunn, 850 I } 2d 1201, 1208-1209 (Utah 1.993). 
rhiislen^en fn\h l ,M i " j^"1 »• pron "< of (lie plain ciror I'ol. 
No error occurred in this case. Trial court judges have the discretion to .illow 
questions by jurors. The Utah Supreme Court in the Anderson case stated that "whether a 
jury would be permitted to ask questions of the witnesses within the discretion of the trial 
co'iif " Hw i ivijii (lull «'(.» i in in noli: llui il'tlir questions ue nol yentiaiie U> (lie issues 
involved or are clearly improper that that may be an error on (he part of tin (rial "ourl. 
Anderson, at 133, 
As is shown in the transcript quoted above, the questioning of Christensen by jurors 
v , . rv:--* . • - •. . L, „ :>. v <o, - ., ;u,. •.< ;:.rK,.; ") jurors were 
primarily designed to clarify issues which had been addressed ; •-• K » n > ^ 
allowing the questioning was within the sound discretion or the iriai ^Ji'i and uie questions 
themselves were not improper, there is simply no error in this case. 
Christensen ,ilsu fails lo sal is IV the second prong o f the plain error test. Christensen 
argues that the error by the trial court was obvious. HOYS PUT d runk fadorhc pfinpoiiil lo 
are the juror questions which were asked by the trial court judge. As was set forth in die 
previous argument, the trial court was within its discretion in allowing the jurors to submit 
;v • ,T -^ ' • .V1*. -v^n • * , - > . . . . i ^.. Joes not constitute an 
error at all, let alone an obvious error. 
Finally, Christensen makes no credible argument that the outcome would have been 
different had the jurors not been allowed to ask questions. As was set forth in the argument 
above, the evidence of guilt is virtually overwhelming. The questions that the jurors asked of 
Christensen demonstrate that they were already questioning his defense. All of the questions 
related directly to concerns about his previous testimony and its lack of corroboration and 
actually provided him with an additional opportunity to clarify or explain is testimony. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that no error occurred as suggested by Christensen 
and that even if the trial court's decision to allow juror questions was in error, the outcome of 
the trial was not affected. Christensen has failed to meet the plain error standard and 
therefore the issue of judicial bias should not be addressed on appeal. The verdict of the jury 
in this case should be upheld. 
III. CHRISTENSEN RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF A 
COMPETENT DEFENSE WHICH RESULTED IN A FAIR AND 
JUST TRIAL. 
Christensen's argument of ineffective assistance of counsel must be measured against 
the two part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). 
That test requires that Christensen demonstrate that his trial counsel's representation failed 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel's unprofessional 
errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870 (Utah 1993). 
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• V» :^ - • *i>-/i J , , ;
 lt •• : v :. v • - .-'lorney's 
performance failed to meet an objective standard of reasoi lableness 1 1 lee i il> faih ire tl lathe 
points to is his counsel's failure to object to the jury questions presented by the judge. The 
mere failure to object to those jurrr questions simply cannot meet the Strickland standard. 
i-i;1 v-'K_: ju'« > ••• yr>\ •- *.. •• .tnesses is specifically within the trial coi irt's 
discretion under Utah Case Law. Siiuvsurli questional" is allowed b> law nml Iho questions 
were not improper since they related to the evidence, no competent attorney would have 
objected in that situation. 
( \*\ •* c ^ a .: A) not meet the second part,/. .;ic srrickland test. As has beer set 
forth previous!" •: *:-!"-:. :',',>.-> •'., -., •  c\^^ • - . • • - _
 k--.*". .-•: u;g 
and his counsel's objection to the few juror questions that were posed by the court would not 
have changed the outcome of the trial. 
Christensen was represented by competent counsel at trial and received a fair and 
impartial trial. No cnmpiMrn! iHonn" would )i-nc beui t;xpt:i.1ed lo \\h\\x\ lo niror 
questioning that is allows under Utah law. The jury verdict in this case should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Ciiristensen's enure appeal is bused on the argument that the trial court, was biased 
because the court asked him questions and "assi imed the role • if prosecutor." This argu n lent 
is based on the false premise that the judge was formulating 'the questions 'himself. The 
transcript reveals that the questions were actually propounded by the jurors, at practice that 
.17 
the judge had consistently used throughout the trial. Because the questions were posed by the 
jury, the questions were related to the evidence and were not improper, and Christensen 
suffered no prejudice as a result, there is no evidence of bias by the trial court. 
Christensen failed to object to the juror questions at trial, therefore, he can only raise 
the issue of bias on appeal if he can show plain error. He cannot meet any of the 
requirements for showing plain error. Since the juror questions are allowed under Utah law, 
there was not error at trial. Since there was no error, it certainly couldn't have been an 
"obvious" error. Finally, since there was no error, Christensen couldn't have been prejudiced 
by the trial court's actions. The plain error test has not been satisfied and Christensen cannot 
raise the issue of judicial bias on appeal. 
Christensen's final argument is that he suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel 
at his trial. However, since the type of juror questioning that he complains of is allowed by 
Utah law no competent counsel would have been expected to object to the trial court's 
actions. Christensen has failed to prove either prong of the Strickland test. He cannot show 
that his counsel was incompetent, nor can he show that the outcome of his trial would have 
been different had his counsel objected to the questions posed by the juror. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Christensen was represented by competent 
counsel, that the trial court committed no plain error, and that the trial court exhibited no bias 
toward him. Christensen's arguments are wholly without merit and the verdict of the jury 
should be upheld. 
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